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ifying of the distribution itself that is used to calculate the risk control. Approach
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is consistent with a Bayesian/personalistic view. We furthermore show that the
two approaches are consistent in achieving the required failure probability. Finally,
we briefly discuss the effects of data pooling and its systemic risk implications.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem statement
We consider the following generic situation emerging in probabilistic risk
analysis:
• A system is subject to a state corresponding to ‘failure’. Failure oc-
curs when a risk factor, modelled as a random variable, exceeds a
predetermined threshold value.
• A risk management objective is to limit the probability of failure to a
small value. In order to do this, it is possible to take control measures,
whose effect is to vary (e.g. increase) the threshold. (This is equivalent
to a shift in the risk factor distribution.) Therefore, for a fixed level
of acceptable failure probability, the desired threshold can be viewed
as a percentile of the risk factor distribution.
• The distribution of the risk factor, in particular the tail probabilities
needed to design control measures, is unknown and must be estimated
from data. This introduces parameter error and therefore one cannot
be fully confident that the target failure probability is achieved.
Below we give three classes of examples, where the above setting may
be seen as a reasonable model of failure and control. The third of these ex-
amples, focusing around insurance solvency, is the leading example around
which arguments in this paper are constructed. The mathematical back-
ground developed is relevant for all examples.
Example 1 (Environmental risks and infrastructure controls). In a sim-
plified model of flood risk, river or coastal flooding (‘failure’) ensues when
when water levels exceed ( overtop) the height of man-made flood defenses.
The acceptable probability for such failure is quite low; for example in the
Netherlands, exceedance probabilities between 1/4000 and 1/10000 have been
specified for coastal areas [1]. This safety requirement, combined with the
relative infrequency of great floods, implies that extrapolations to the tail
probabilities of water levels are needed [2].
More broadly, investment in infrastructure and appropriate regulation
can reduce the vulnerability to natural hazards. For example building codes
can reduce the vulnerability to seismic risk, thus reducing the probability of
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damage to a building subjected to a ‘design earthquake’ with given return
period [3].
Example 2 (Supply chain risks and inventory controls). In inventory prob-
lems, sufficient quantities of some good need to be stocked in order to be able
to satisfy demand over a predetermined time period. Unknown demand is
now the risk factor and the level of stock held is the control. As failure, we
consider the scenario where demand exceeds stocked goods. Very different
situations, besides classic supply chain problems, can be framed as inventory
risks.
An example in health risk management relates to the possible shortage of
antiviral drugs in the case of an influenza epidemic. Health providers such
as the National Health Service in Britain stock antiviral drugs [4] and the
maintenance of an insufficient stock would be considered as a precautionary
failure[5]. Hence the probability of antiviral drugs running out in the event
of an outbreak should be very low. However the relative rarity of major
epidemics and the complexity of their dynamics, imply that there may be
substantial uncertainty around the potential demand on antiviral drugs.
Moving to a different context, the US government holds a Stategic Petroleum
Reserve, currently (July 2010) of 727m barrels of crude oil corresponding to
approximately 75 days of import protection, to be used in case of an energy
supply crisis [6]. Emergency drawdowns are rare, the last two having taken
place in the aftermath of the 2005 Hurricane Katrina disaster and during
the 1990/91 Desert Shield/Storm operation. Setting the size of the reserve
to a level that will be able to handle an major crisis in international energy
supply is a matter of substantial strategic importance for the US government.
Example 3 (Insolvency risk and capital controls). Financial firms such as
insurance companies are exposed to random future liabilities, such as insur-
ance claims, drops in asset values, and operational losses. In order that the
firms are able to pay their liabilities under adverse scenarios, they hold risk
capital. Risk capital is calculated according to a regulatory principle and/or
the firm’s own risk tolerance level. Most insurance and banking regulation
adopts the Value-at-Risk principle for risk capital calculation, requiring that
the probability of future losses exceeding capital is limited to a fixed low level
[7]). For example the impending Solvency II regulatory regime for European
insurers requires that the probability of insolvency (failure) for an insurance
company be at most 0.5% per annum [8]. Hence risk capital is typically
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determined as a percentile of a loss distribution.
The calculation of risk capital is subject to substantial parameter uncer-
tainty, since the calculation of an extreme percentile from a data set of lim-
ited size leads to potentially inaccurate capital estimates. In particular, for
many types of insurance risk such as catastrophe insurance, characterised by
low frequency / high severity events, relevant data are necessarily scarce and
capital may have to be estimated from just a few tens of loss observations.
1.2 Results
We henceforth use the language of the third example, focusing on the prob-
lem of insurance solvency. In this contribution we address the following
research questions:
1. Does parameter uncertainty increase the probability of insolvency of
insurance companies and by how much?
2. Can the regulatory capital setting regime be adjusted to reflect the
effect of parameter uncertainty?
3. What is the potential effect of firms’ loss data sharing arrangements,
both at the firm and the systemic risk level?
To answer the first question, we propose a conceptualisation of parame-
ter uncertainty via frequentist arguments. The key idea here is to represent
the calculated risk capital as a random variable, since it is a function of the
random sample from which capital has been calculated. Then, the proba-
bility of insolvency is calculated as the probability of a random loss variable
exceeding a random capital amount. We argue that this is essentially a regu-
latory view of parameter uncertainty, whereby the probability of insolvency
is understood as an expected frequency of insolvency across risk portfolios.
(It is noted that regulators are not the only agents having a stake in the sol-
vency of an insurance operation. Rating agencies often perform a role similar
to that of regulators, in awarding a rating that is, at least loosely, associ-
ated with a failure probability. Hence this ‘regulatory view,’ also applies
to rating agencies. Moreover reinsurers are often closely involved in actual
modelling of the risks that primary insurance companies cede to them. For a
reinsurer, the probability of an insurance claim exceeding a given threshold
is of interest, as this would trigger a payment to the insurer.)
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The probabilities of solvency and insolvency thus calculated generally
depend on the values of the true but unknown loss distribution parameters.
We show that for a wide range of loss distributions, derived by increasing
transforms of location-scale families and including well known distributions
such as Normal, Lognormal, Exponential, Pareto and Weibull, this depen-
dence on the true parameters vanishes. Hence, if only the family of loss
distributions considered is known, it is possible to calculate the effect of
parameter uncertainty on solvency probabilities. Typically, for capital cal-
culated according to a given required confidence level, the probability of
solvency will increase with the sample size of the historical data used to
calculate tail probabilities, so that a larger data set implies that the holder
of a risk portfolio is more secure.
It is also shown that, while the effect of parameter uncertainty on sol-
vency probabilities is affected by the family of loss distributions considered,
it is not affected in an obvious way by the distribution’s tail behaviour. It
is for example shown that the probability of solvency may be the same for a
light-tailed (e.g. exponential) and a heavy-tailed distribution (e.g. Pareto).
Addressing the second question, we propose two methods for adjusting
the risk capital calculation for financial firms, so that the problem of param-
eter uncertainty is addressed and the probability of insolvency constrained
at an acceptable level. In the first method, capital has to be calculated using
a different confidence level (estimated percentile of the loss distribution) for
each risk portfolio. The confidence level used for each portfolio depends on
the number of loss data points available, so that a portfolio with a long his-
tory (and hence low parameter uncertainty) receives more lenient treatment
than a portfolio for which few relevant loss observations exist.
While this method is consistent with controlling the probability of insol-
vency, as proposed in this paper, we argue that it is ill suited for practical
application, as it is at odds with principles-based regulatory practice. In-
stead, we propose setting capital requirements using a predictive distribu-
tion, obtained by standard Bayesian methods. So, rather than adjusting the
confidence level of the capital setting regime, the loss distribution used for
capital calculation is replaced by a more dispersed one. We then show that
for loss distributions in transformed location-scale families, the use of a pre-
dictive distribution serves its regulatory purpose, by producing a probability
of solvency, as viewed by a regulator, at the required level.
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Finally, we discuss the case of holders of risk portfolios with similar
exposures sharing their loss data, in order to reduce parameter uncertainty.
We argue that, while this reduces the insolvency probability for individual
portfolios, one has to make sure that systemic risk is not increased due to the
dependence between portfolios’ insolvency events induced by data sharing.
In the next section the relation of this research to the literature is dis-
cussed. The effect of parameter uncertainty on the solvency probability is
presented in Section 2 and the proposed adjustments to the capital setting
regime in Section 3. Data sharing is discussed in Section 4. Conclusions are
given in Section 5. In these sections the concepts are presented in a relatively
informal manner and illustrated by examples where explicit derivations are
possible. All results are formally stated and proved in the Appendix.
1.3 Relation to the literature
Parameter and model uncertainty have long been fundamental issues in
probabilistic risk analysis [9]. While consideration of such uncertainties in
a Bayesian framework is common [10], there has been a vigorous debate
among risk analysts regarding appropriate methods of quantifying such un-
certainties; in particular the argument that probability is appropriate only
for the modelling of process variability, rather than epistemic uncertainties
has been made (see [11] as well as the responses to that article).
In the context of actuarial, insurance and financial risk management, pa-
rameter uncertainty and data issues have been discussed [12],[13],[14],[15],[16],
though the implications of parameter uncertainty for solvency have been
rarely studied in detail [17]. The emergence of risk-sensitive regulation in
insurance markets, such as the European Solvency II regime, has produced
a renewed interest in parameter uncertainty, in particular among practition-
ers who are called to estimate extreme percentiles from incomplete samples
[18],[19],[20].
The approaches used in the literature for quantifying parameter uncer-
tainty in insurance are generally based on deriving predictive distributions
[12],[16]. Our approach is quite different, as it is based on a notion of param-
eter uncertainty, that draws from ideas of frequentist predictive inference
[21]. By viewing the capital required to assure a given solvency probability
as itself a random variable (through its dependence on the random sample),
we reflect the way that uncertainty permeates insurers’ decision processes,
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an issue not generally addressed in the literature.
While we reserve a frequentist setting to reflect the regulatory view of
uncertainty, we propose a Bayesian approach, better suited to the view of
insurance market participants, for the actual method of risk capital cal-
culation. We show that for the family of loss distributions considered in
this paper these two different views of uncertainty are in practice equiva-
lent, which follows from literature on probability matching priors and the
frequentist validity of Bayesian procedures [22].
The following limitations apply to the scope of our article:
• While we propose approaches based on complementary statistical method-
ologies and interpret these from the point of view of different stake-
holders, we do not aim at discussing the philosophical underpinnings
of parameter uncertainty quantification.
• We limit ourselves to the situation where the distribution family of
the modelled risks is known, with only the parameters needing to be
estimated. (The precise level of prior knowledge required about the
underlying loss distribution will be made clearer in Section 2.3.)
• We do not consider the possibility of structural changes in the data
generating process, which would call for a different conception of return
periods of extreme loss events [23].
• Asymptotic analysis of the problems we are discussing is possible
[21],[24], but is not considered in this study, since our focus is on situ-
ations where samples are very small.
2 SOLVENCY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
2.1 Probability of solvency
A portfolio of risks will produce a future loss over a fixed time horizon given
by random variable Y . We assume that Y follows a probability distribution
F (·; θ), where θ ∈ S ⊂ Rd is the unknown vector of parameters. The
distribution family F is known.
The parameter θ is estimated from a random sample X = (X1, . . . , Xn)
(representing for example the portfolio’s loss history or a benchmark data
set), where Xi ∼ Fi(·; θ), i = 1, . . . , n. Again the families Fi(·; θ) are known.
We do not require that each data point comes from the same distribution
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as the loss Y , but only that it is governed by the same parameter(s). We
assume throughout that the random variables X1, . . . , Xn, Y are mutually
independent and that the distributions F1, . . . , Fn, F are continuous, invert-
ible, with densities f1, . . . , fn, f . The unknown parameter θ is estimated
from the sample X by an estimator θˆ = θˆ(X), typically using maximum
likelihood methods.
X1, . . . , Xn may represent the company’s observed losses from n time
periods (aggregates for each period). The difference in the distributions
F1, . . . , Fn may then represent necessary adjustments, e.g. for risk exposures
and business volumes changing over time. Alternatively, we could take i.i.d.
X1, . . . , Xn to stand for individual observed losses (e.g. insurance claims for
a specific year arising from the insurer’s risk portfolio). Then the future
loss is given by a compound model Y =
∑N
j=1X
′
j , where X
′
j has the same
distribution as X1 and N is the annual loss frequency with (known) distri-
bution. Then Y will again have a distribution with parameters θ. We note
the distinction between n, the size of the data-set used affecting parameter
error, and N , the size of the portfolio driving process error.
A regulator requires that the risk capital c(p; θ) held in respect of the
future loss Y be given by the relationship:
Pθ[Y ≤ c(p; θ)] = p =⇒ c(p; θ) = F−1(p; θ), (1)
where Pθ[A] is the probability of an event A, for parameter value θ, and
F−1(p; θ) is the 100pth percentile of the distribution F (·; θ). However, given
that the parameter vector θ is unknown, capital will in practice be set as
a percentile of the loss distribution, using the estimated parameter values.
Denote the capital thus calculated by:
c(p;X) = F−1(p; θˆ(X)) (2)
The risk capital c(p;X) is thus a function of the confidence level and the
data. From the point of view of the portfolio holder, given the particular
data observed, the capital c(p;X) is a fixed number, which may be smaller or
greater than the theoretically correct capital level F−1(p; θ). However from
the point of view of an experimental designer (or regulator), the capital
c(p;X) appears to be a random variable, due to the randomness of the
vector X. Following the latter interpretation, we can define the probability
of solvency as:
γ(p; θ) = Pθ[Y ≤ c(p;X)]. (3)
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This is the probability, calculated with respect to the true (but unknown)
parameters θ, of the future loss Y (a random variable) being lower than the
capital held (another random variable). We denote the associated insolvency
probability by γ(p; θ) = 1− γ(p; θ).
How are we then to interpret equation (3)? Assume that there is a large
number of independent risk portfolios, for all of which capital is calculated
according to the same method. Due to the randomness of the respective
samples, some of those portfolios will be allocated capital that is higher and
some capital that is lower than the theoretically correct value. Then γ(p; θ)
corresponds to the expected fraction of portfolios for which the future loss
will be lower than the capital held. So, from the perspective of a regulator
the quantity 1− γ(p; θ) can be seen as an expected default frequency across
portfolios, taking into account the potential parameter error in capital esti-
mates.
Alternatively, one could view (3) in the context of a Monte-Carlo ex-
periment. Assume that a large number m of ‘histories’
(
X(1), Y (1)
)
, . . . ,(
X(m), Y (m)
)
are simulated, under the true parameters θ. For each history,
the capital c(p,X(i)) is calculated according to (2). Then γ(p; θ) represents,
asymptotically for large m, the fraction of histories for which the capital
c(p,X(i)) is higher than the respective loss Y (i).
In this way, we characterise the probability of (in)solvency for a partic-
ular portfolio, allowing for parameter uncertainty. If parameter uncertainty
has a detrimental effect one would have γ(p; θ) ≤ p⇔ γ(p; θ) ≥ 1− p. Note
however that the explicit calculation of γ(p; θ) is in reality problematic, as
it presupposes knowledge of the true parameter θ, which is unknown. For
example, calculation of the solvency probability via the Monte-Carlo scheme
outlined above is not possible if one does not know under which distribution
to simulate. Nonetheless, the following two examples show that this prob-
lem is not fatal, as dependence on the unknown parameter θ can often be
eliminated.
Example 4. Let X1, . . . , Xn, Y be i.i.d. exponentially distributed with mean
θ, i.e. F (x; θ) = 1−e−x/θ, x > 0. The maximum likelihood estimator of θ is
θˆ = 1n
∑n
j=1Xj ∼ Gam(n, θ/n), so that the moment generating function of θˆ
is Mθˆ(t) =
(
1− θn t
)−n
. The capital held is given by c(p;X) = −θˆ log(1− p).
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Hence the probability of insolvency γ(p; θ) is calculated as:
γ(p; θ) = Eθ [Pθ (Y > c(p;X)|X)]
= E
[
exp
(
−−θˆ log(1− p)
θ
)]
= Mθˆ
(
log(1− p)
θ
)
=
(
1− θ
n
log(1− p)
θ
)−n
=⇒ γ(p; θ) =
[
1 +
1
n
log
1
1− p
]−n
(4)
We can see that the probability of insolvency γ(p; θ) is in fact independent
of the true parameter θ and is a function only of the confidence level p and
the size of the sample n. In figure 1a), the insolvency probability γ(p; θ) is
plotted against the sample size n for confidence levels p = 0.99, 0.995, 0.999.
The following can be observed:
• The probability of insolvency is decreasing in the number of data points
n. This makes intuitive sense: the larger the sample, the higher the
accuracy of the capital assessment and thus the lower the probability
of insolvency.
• In particular as the sample size becomes very large, the insolvency
probability tends to its required value 1 − p, as can also be seen by
noting that limn→∞
[
1 + 1n log
1
1−p
]n
= exp
(
log 11−p
)
= 11−p , so that
limn→∞ γ(p; θ) = 1− p.
• For small data sets, parameter error may cause the probability of in-
solvency to be substantially higher than the required value; in that
sense a high confidence level quoted may be rather misleading in the
presence of parameter uncertainty. For example if n = 10 and p =
0.99, 0.995, 0.999 the ratios of the true to the required probability of in-
solvency are γ(0.99;θ)1−0.99 =
0.023
0.01 = 2.26,
γ(0.995;θ)
1−0.995 =
0.014
0.005 = 2.85,
γ(0.999;θ)
1−0.999 =
0.005
0.001 = 5.24.
Example 5. Suppose now that X1, . . ., Xn, Y are independent normal
N(µ, σ2) variables, so that θ = (µ, σ). The maximum likelihood estima-
tors are µˆ =
∑n
j=1Xj and σˆ
2 = n−1
∑
(Xi − X¯)2, with σˆ independent of
µˆ. We may write µˆ = µ + σU/
√
n, σˆ2 = σ2V/n, where U ∼ N(0, 1),
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Figure 1: Probability of insolvency γ(p; θ) for a) exponentially and b)
normally distributed losses, against sample size n, for confidence levels
p = 0.99, 0.995, 0.999
V ∼ χ2n−1, and V is independent of U . The capital held is given by c(p,X) =
F−1(p; (µˆ, σˆ)) = µˆ+ σˆΦ−1(p), where Φ is the N(0, 1) distribution function.
Now
Pθ[Y ≤ c(p,X)] = Pθ[Y − µˆ ≤ σˆΦ−1(p)],
Observe that Y − µˆ ∼ N (0, n+1n σ2), independent of V , implying that√
n
n+ 1
· Y − µˆ√
σ2V/(n− 1) ∼ tn−1.
In consequence,
γ(p; θ) = Tn−1
(√
n− 1
n+ 1
Φ−1(p)
)
, (5)
where Tn−1(·) denotes the distribution of a tn−1 variable. In figure 1b) the
insolvency probability is again plotted as a function of n, giving a very similar
pattern to that observed for the exponential distribution. For n→∞ we have
Tn−1 → Φ so that again limn→∞ γ(p; θ) = p.
2.2 Increasing transformations
Given that the confidence level p is generally chosen to be close to 1, the
solvency probability γ(p; θ) relates to the extreme tail of the loss distribution.
It may then be assumed that the overall shape and in particular the tail
properties of the loss distribution F (·; θ) have a substantial effect on the
solvency probability. For example, is the ratio γ(p;θ)1−p higher for heavy- rather
than light-tailed distributions?
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Such a relationship is not straightforward. To show this consider another
portfolio, for which the sample and future loss considered satisfy
X∗1
d
= h1(X1), . . . , X
∗
n
d
= hn(Xn), Y
∗ d= h(Y ),
where
d
= denotes equality in distribution and h1, . . . , hn, h are strictly in-
creasing functions not depending on the parameter θ.
It can then be easily shown (Lemma 2 in the Appendix) that the solvency
probabilities for the two portfolios are actually going to be the same, that
is:
Pθ[Y ≤ F−1(p; θˆ(X))] = Pθ[Y ∗ ≤ F ∗−1(p; θˆ(X∗))] (6)
Note that for a non-linear function h, the probability distributions of the
losses Y and Y ∗ may have very different shapes, e.g. Y may be light-tailed
and/or symmetric, while Y ∗ is heavy-tailed and/or skewed. Remarkably,
the effect of parameter uncertainty on the solvency probability of those two
portfolios is the same. This is seen in the following example.
Example 6. Consider i.i.d. exponential losses X1, . . . , Xn, Y ∼ F (x; θ) =
1 − e−xθ , x > 0. Define now X∗1 , . . . , X∗n, Y ∗ ∼ F ∗(x; θ) = 1 − x−
1
θ , x > 1
via the transformation h(t) = et. Therefore, X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n, Y
∗ follow a one-
parameter Pareto distribution. The tail-behaviour of the Pareto distribution
is very different to that of the exponential distribution; in fact it is known
from extreme value theory [25] that the exponential and Pareto distributions
form limiting cases of the tails of light- and heavy-tailed distributions respec-
tively. Lemma 2 implies that for both these distributions the probability of
solvency γ(p; θ) will be the same, given by formula (4). This implies that
for the Pareto distribution the solvency probability is again independent of
the unknown parameter θ.
Similarly, for normally distributed losses X1, . . . , Xn, Y ∼ N(µ, σ2), by
applying the transformation h(t) = et we get a Lognormally distributed loss
profile X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n, Y
∗. Again the Normal and Lognormal distributions are
very different; the former is symmetric, has unbounded support and is light-
tailed, while the latter is skewed, has positive support and is heavy tailed
(in the sense of sub-exponentiality [25]). The formula (5) will apply to both
distributions, so that the solvency probability for the Lognormal distribution
is again independent of the unknown parameters (µ, σ).
Hence the shape and heavy-tailedness of the loss distribution does not af-
fect the solvency probabilities in an obvious way. What may, however, affect
12
these probabilities is the number of unknown parameters in the distribution.
In Table I the insolvency probabilities γ(p; θ) for the Exponential/Pareto,
Normal/Log-normal models, as well as a one-parameter Normal model with
known mean, are compared for p = 0.99, 0.995, 0.999. It can be seen that
in all cases the 2-parameter Normal/Log-normal model produces a higher
probability of insolvency than the Exponential/Pareto one. This may be at-
tributed to the fact that the Normal/Log-normal model has an additional lo-
cation parameter, which exacerbates the effect of parameter uncertainty. On
the other hand, a 1-parameter Normal model, with only the variance (scale
parameter) unknown, gives results very close to those of the exponential.
Table I: Comparison of insolvency probabilities γ(p; θ) for the Exponen-
tial/Pareto and Normal/Log-normal models (for p = 0.99, 0.995, 0.999).
p = 0.99 n = 10 n = 20 n = 50 n = 100 n =∞
Exponential / Pareto 0.0226 0.0159 0.0122 0.0111 0.0100
Normal / Lognormal 0.0323 0.0197 0.0135 0.0117 0.0100
1-param. Normal (θ = σ) 0.0212 0.0153 0.0120 0.0110 0.0100
p = 0.995 n = 10 n = 20 n = 50 n = 100 n =∞
Exponential / Pareto 0.0142 0.0091 0.0065 0.0057 0.0050
Normal / Lognormal 0.0224 0.0121 0.0080 0.0061 0.0050
1-param. Normal (θ = σ) 0.0138 0.0090 0.0065 0.0057 0.0050
p = 0.999 n = 10 n = 20 n = 50 n = 100 n =∞
Exponential / Pareto 0.0052 0.0026 0.0015 0.0013 0.0010
Normal / Lognormal 0.0104 0.0042 0.0020 0.0014 0.0010
1-param. Normal (θ = σ) 0.0057 0.0029 0.0016 0.0013 0.0010
2.3 Independence of solvency probability from parameters
In the examples of Sections 2.1 and 2.2 it was seen that for particular distri-
butions it is possible to simply calculate the probability of solvency under
parameter uncertainty, since it does not depend on the unknown true pa-
rameters. In fact, this useful property holds not just for the special cases
considered, but for a wide class of probability distributions, including many
popular choices in risk modelling, that may be symmetric or asymmetric,
with bounded or unbounded support, light- or heavy-tailed.
The families of distributions we consider are 2-parameter transformed
location-scale families and 1-parameter transformed scale families. A ran-
dom variable follows a distribution belonging to a transformed (location-)
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scale family if an increasing function of that random variable belongs to a
(location-) scale family. For example, if Y is exponentially distributed (a
scale family) then the random variable Y ∗ = eY is Pareto distributed (a
transformed scale family). A formal definition of transformed (location-)
scale families is given the Appendix. (Transformed location families can be
similarly defined and results similar to the ones derived later on for scale
and location-scale families hold. However these distributions are less useful
for loss modelling purposes and we will not be concerned with them here.)
Examples of location-scale families are the normal distribution, the t-
distribution, the logistic distribution, and the Laplace distribution. Such
distributions are commonly used in modelling asset log-returns [7],[26]. By
letting h(t) = et, we can derive from the distributions above, the log-normal,
log-t, log-logistic (or Fisk) and log-Laplace distributions. Besides their pos-
sible use in asset return modelling these are popular models in modelling
heavy-tailed insurance or operational risk losses [27],[7]). It is simple to show
that other popular loss distributions such as the two-parameter Weibull [24]
can also be transformed to a (non-symmetric) location-scale family.
The simpler class of 1-parameter scale families includes the exponential
distribution, the Gamma and Weibull distributions (with shape parameter
fixed), or indeed any location-scale family with the location parameter fixed.
By transforming the exponential distribution via h(t) = et, we get the 1-
parameter Pareto distribution, with cdf 1−x−1/θ, x > 1. It is easy to see that
the usual Pareto distribution 1− ba(b+ x)−a also belongs to a transformed
scale family if we keep either of the two parameters fixed.
Some of these distributions and their uses in insurance loss modelling
are summarised in Table II.
We then have the following result, stated as Proposition 1 in the Ap-
pendix. If the probability distributions of the data F1(·; θ), . . . , Fn(·; θ) and
of the future loss F (·; θ) belong to a transformed (location-) scale family,
capital is calculated by an estimated loss percentile as in equation (2), and
the parameter(s) θ are estimated via maximum likelihood, the corresponding
probability of insolvency γ(p; θ) does not depend on the true parameter(s) θ.
Therefore, for a wide range of useful loss models it is possible to determine
explicitly the effect of parameter uncertainty on the probability of solvency.
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Table II: Distributions in transformed (location-)scale families that are com-
monly used in insurance loss modelling. Location and scale parameters are
denoted by µ, σ respectively; parameters otherwise denoted are considered
as known.
Name Density Use
Exponential 1σ exp
(−xσ) , x > 0 Individual claims, but re-
stricted by its simplistic
shape.
Pareto (I) u
1/σ
σ x
−1/σ−1, x > u Large individual claims, of-
ten for natural catastrophe
risks and in reinsurance.
Pareto (II) b
1/σ
σ (b+ x)
−1/σ−1, x > 0 Large individual claims in
excess of a threshold.
Gamma x
a−1 exp(−x/σ)
σaΓ(a) , x > 0 Aggregate loss in an insur-
ance portfolio, when coef-
ficient of variation 1/
√
a is
given.
Normal 1√
2piσ
exp
(
− (x−µ)2
2σ2
)
Aggregate loss in well di-
versified portfolios, e.g.
motor insurance.
Log-Normal
exp
(
− (log x−µ)2
2σ2
)
√
2piσx
, x > 0 Individual or portfolio loss,
allowing a moderate level
of extreme losses. Used
widely e.g. in marine, avi-
ation or liability insurance.
Weibull αx
α−1
βα exp {−(x/β)α} , x > 0 Individual or portfolio loss,
β = eµ, α = 1/σ with flexibility of allowing
a low or moderate level of
extreme losses.
2.4 Numerical calculation of solvency probability
Exact calculation of the probability of solvency can be surmised from Propo-
sition 1 in the Appendix. However, such calculation requires integration
with respect to the density of the estimator, which is not generally known
in closed form. However, the solvency probability can always be calculated
numerically, e.g. via a Monte-Carlo scheme such as the one described in
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Section 2.1. The simulation of different loss histories can take place for any
choice of parameters, for example by setting the location and scale param-
eters to 0 and 1 respectively; Proposition 1 guarantees that the choice of
parameters will not affect the result. The following example illustrates the
process.
Example 7. Consider i.i.d. X1, . . . , Xn ∼ F (·; θ) where F (·; θ), θ = (µ, σ),
is a Weibull distribution such that
F (x; θ) = 1− exp
{
− (e−µx)1/σ} , x > 0.
The Weibull distribution is a popular choice for modelling insurance losses,
as it can represent a range of tail-behaviour, depending on the choice of
shape parameter σ (or α = 1/σ in a more usual parameterisation [27]) . The
increasing transformation X∗i = logXi, Y
∗ = log Y yields random variables
following a negative Gumbel distribution
F ∗(x; θ) = 1− exp
{
e−
x−µ
σ
}
.
The Gumbel distribution is a location-scale family, hence Proposition 1 ap-
plies and the probability of solvency γ(p; θ) does not depend on the true
parameters θ = (µ, σ).
There is no explicit formula for Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE)
θˆ = (µˆ, σˆ) of θ, which is given as the solution to the system of equations
nσˆ +
∑n
j=1 log
(
e−µˆXj
)−∑nj=1 (e−µˆXj)1/σˆ log (e−µˆXj) = 0(
1
n
∑n
j=1X
1/σˆ
j
)σˆ
− eµˆ = 0
(7)
It has been shown that in estimating parameters for the Gumbel distribution
using small samples, the MLE is outperformed (in the Mean-Squared-Error
sense) by estimators based on Probability Weighted Moments (PWM)[28],[29].
PWM estimators are also computationally simpler to evaluate, giving for-
mulas
σ˜ =

 2
n
n∑
j=1
j − 1
n− 1Xj:n − X¯

 / log 2, µ˜ = X¯ + γσ˜, (8)
where X¯ is the sample mean, X1:n ≤ X2:n ≤ · · · ≤ Xn:n are the order
statistics and γ ≃ 0.57721 is the Euler constant. The estimators (8), simi-
larly to MLE, satisfy an equivariance property (in the sense of Lemma 3 in
the Appendix), which means that Proposition 1 still holds and the solvency
probability does not depend on the unknown parameters.
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The required capital is then calculated as
c(p;X) = e−m (− log(1− p))s , (9)
by setting either (m, s) = (µˆ, σˆ) or (m, s) = (µ˜, σ˜).
Hence the following algorithm can be used to calculate γ(p; θ) using a
Monte-Carlo sample of size r:
• Loop from i = 1 to i = r
– Generate i.i.d. observations (xi,1, . . . , xi,n, yi) from F (·; (0, 1)).
– Estimate µ, σ by (7) or (8).
– Calculate capital c(p;xi) by (9).
– Record a ‘success’ if c(p;xi) ≥ yi.
• Estimate γ(p; θ) as the number of successes divided by r.
The algorithm was used in order to calculate the insolvency probabil-
ity γ¯(p; θ) for confidence levels p = 0.99, 0.995, 0.999 and sample sizes n =
10, 20, 50, 100. The calculation was carried out using a Monte-Carlo sample
of size r = 107 and parameters were estimated with both the MLE and PWM
methods. Results are summarised in Table III. Under PWM estimation, the
insolvency probabilities for the Weibull distribution are very close to those
of the 2-parameter (Log)normal distribution in Table I. However, for small
samples, the probability of insolvency is substantially higher when MLE is
used. This is explained by the worse performance of MLE compared to PWM
for the Gumbel/Weibull distribution, that has been observed [28],[29]. In-
tuitively, less accurate parameter estimates are more likely to give rise to
inappropriate capital estimates and hence exacerbate the effect of parame-
ter uncertainty. The example indicates that weaknesses in the estimation
method itself may substantially increase the probability of insolvency.
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Table III: Insolvency probabilities γ(p; θ) for the Weibull distribution, us-
ing Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and Probability Weighted Mo-
ments (PWM). Calculated with Monte-Carlo sample of size r = 107.
p = 0.990 n = 10 n = 20 n = 50 n = 100 n =∞
MLE 0.0531 0.0237 0.0146 0.0124 0.0100
PWM 0.0306 0.0199 0.0139 0.0120 0.0100
p = 0.995 n = 10 n = 20 n = 50 n = 100 n =∞
MLE 0.0439 0.0159 0.0084 0.0066 0.0050
PWM 0.0227 0.0132 0.0081 0.0065 0.0050
p = 0.999 n = 10 n = 20 n = 50 n = 100 n =∞
MLE 0.0324 0.0075 0.0027 0.0017 0.0010
PWM 0.0129 0.0058 0.0026 0.0017 0.0010
3 ADJUSTING THE CAPITAL REQUIREMENT
It was argued in Section 2 that, when capital is held equal to an estimated
percentile of the loss distribution, the solvency probability for the loss port-
folio is generally lower than the specified confidence level, due to the effect
of parameter uncertainty. Formally,
γ(p; θ) = Pθ[Y ≤ F−1(p; θˆ)] ≤ Pθ[Y ≤ F−1(p; θ)] = p.
Such a situation is of course unsatisfactory, since the true probability of a
portfolio being solvent can be substantially lower than the one required by,
for example, a regulator or the holder’s own risk management.
In this section we explore two methods for adjusting the capital require-
ment, in order to reflect the effect of parameter uncertainty on solvency and
thus increase the solvency probability to its required level. In both methods
the capital requirement becomes higher. The first one relies on raising the
confidence level of the solvency capital calculation, while the second one,
based on Bayesian arguments, adjusts the probability distribution used for
capital setting.
3.1 Raising the confidence level
One could address the problem of the solvency probability being lower than
its specified level, by setting the capital at a higher confidence level, that is,
require that capital is set by:
c(p∗;X) = F−1(p∗; θˆ), p∗ > p
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The adjusted confidence level p∗ could then be selected by requiring that
γ(p∗;X) = Pθ[Y ≤ c(p∗;X)] = p (10)
If the loss distribution F (·; θ) belongs to a transformed (location-) scale fam-
ily, the probability of solvency does not depend on the unknown parameter
θ. Hence we can explicitly solve equation (10) and specify the adjusted
confidence level p∗. The process is illustrated in the following example.
Example 8. Let as before X1, . . . , Xn, Y distributed according to an expo-
nential or one-parameter Pareto distribution. Then it was shown in Example
4 that the solvency probability is given by:
γ(p; θ) = 1−
[
1 +
1
n
log
1
1− p
]−n
We require
γ(p∗; θ) = p =⇒ p∗ = 1− exp
{
−n
[
(1− p)−1/n − 1
]}
Therefore the confidence level according to which the capital has to be calcu-
lated becomes a function of the size n of the dataset. This is demonstrated
in figure 2, where the value of p∗ is plotted against n for different values of
the required solvency level p = 0.99, 0.995, 0.999. It can be seen that p∗ de-
creases as the sample size n gets larger, so that p∗ → p as n→∞. Hence the
holder of a portfolio with a long history of relevant data will have to calculate
its capital according to a confidence level close to the required solvency prob-
ability p. In contrast, the holder of a portfolio for which very few observed
data exist will have to set capital according to a confidence level that is much
higher than p. For example, for n = 10 we have p = 0.99 ⇒ p∗ = 0.9971,
p = 0.995⇒ p∗ = 0.9991, p = 0.999⇒ p∗ = 0.99995.
Following the approach suggested here, each loss portfolio will have to
be assigned a different confidence level p∗, on which the capital requirement
is based, where p∗ depends on the loss distribution and the sample size
for the portfolio. On the face of it this makes sense: long experience and
diligent data collection are rewarded with a lower capital requirement; lack of
experience and incomplete data are penalised. It is noted that this argument
refers to relevant experience. It may be that a company has a long history
but changes in the risk profile, e.g. due to changes in portfolio mix or perils
driven by climate change, render much of that data set irrelevant. We do
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Figure 2: Adjusted confidence level p∗ used for capital setting in the expo-
nential/Pareto model, as a function of sample size n, for required solvency
probabilities p = 0.99, 0.995, 0.999
not deal with the case of detecting distributional changes over time, and
assume throughout that the data used are i.i.d.; discarding irrelevant data
of course reduces the sample size and increases the capital requirement.
There are other problems with adopting such an approach in practice
too. Consider that the capital requirement is being set by a regulator. This
means that the regulator would have to set a different confidence level p∗
for each regulated risk portfolio. Therefore the regulator would have to be
equipped with the knowledge of each portfolio’s aggregate loss distribution
(assuming this belongs to a transformed location-scale family), so that p∗ can
be calculated. Gathering such information may be logistically challenging
and assumes that regulators would be much closer to insurance company’s
modelling than they really are. Moreover, such an approach may appear
excessively prescriptive and thus at odds with principles-based regulatory
regimes such as ICAS and Solvency II.
Furthermore, such capital setting would likely be challenged by the port-
folio holders. The adoption of different confidence levels across portfolios
would give the impression of inequity and may be politically difficult to sup-
port. Implementation of the regime would not be helped by the potential
difficulty of explaining it to portfolio holders. The adjustment to the con-
fidence level relies on the rather abstract notion of a random capital level,
as in equations (2), (3). As discussed in Section 2.1, this may be best ex-
plained as an expected frequency of solvency across portfolios. While such
a quantity is certainly meaningful from a regulatory perspective, it is not
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necessarily relevant to individual portfolio holders such as insurance firms.
After all, the idea of a random capital level may strike portfolio holders, who
have already observed past losses and set their capital at a fixed amount,
as rather odd. Of course, no regulator would communicate in such abstract
terms, but instead state that a higher requirement is due whenever there
is insufficient information about the loss distribution. While this may help
communication, it would not resolve the underlying epistemic problem.
The next section proposes an adjusted capital requirement that addresses
these issues.
3.2 Adjusting the loss distribution
If holders of risk portfolios find the frequentist interpretation of parameter
uncertainty used to justify the adjustment in Section 3.1 meaningless, a dif-
ferent conceptualisation of uncertainty is necessary. This can be achieved
using standard Bayesian arguments. Unknown parameters can be consid-
ered as random quantities and the additional risk to solvency induced by
parameter uncertainty can be reflected by constructing a more dispersed
predictive distribution.
A prior density pi(θ) is defined over the parameter space θ ∈ S. The prior
pi is potentially improper and can be chosen to be uninformative, so that
subjective judgement does not enter the calculation. Given the observed
data X = x, the parameters’ posterior density is given by:
pi(θ|x) = I(x)−1pi(θ)
n∏
j=1
fj(xj ; θ), (11)
where I(x) =
∫
η∈S pi(η)
∏n
j=1 fj(xj ; η)dη. The predictive density and distri-
bution of Y are respectively defined as:
fˆ(y|x) =
∫
η∈S
f(y; η)pi(η|x)dη, Fˆ (y|x) =
∫
η∈S
F (y; η)pi(η|x)dη. (12)
Probabilities calculated using the predictive density are denoted by Pˆ (·|x).
An alternative way of raising the capital requirement is then, rather than
increase the confidence level, to adjust the loss distribution used for capital
setting by using the predictive distribution. This reflects parameter uncer-
tainty by being typically more dispersed than the loss distribution F (·; θˆ(x)).
Thus capital can be set as a percentile of the predictive distribution:
cˆ(p|x) = Fˆ−1(p|x). (13)
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Such an approach presents substantial practical advantages compared to
the adjustment of the confidence level discussed in Section 3.1. A regulatory
regime whereby capital is set as a percentile of the predictive distribution is
consistent with principle-based regimes; the regulator has only to specify a
confidence level, the same for all companies, and all calculations are carried
out by companies themselves. The regulator does not need to have access
to loss data or to know the family of loss distributions best describing the
portfolio’s loss profile. In effect, the change from current regulatory practices
would be marginal; rather than the regulator saying ‘calculate your capital
requirement as the 99.5th percentile of your estimated loss distribution,”
he would say ‘calculate your capital requirement as the 99.5th percentile
of your predictive loss distribution.” Furthermore, from the perspective of
portfolio holders, reflecting parameter uncertainty by defining a distribution
over the parameters may be easier to interpret than viewing the capital held
as a random number.
It is, however, not clear whether setting capital by the predictive dis-
tribution has the desired effect, that is, whether it raises the probability of
solvency, with respect to the true parameters, to an acceptable level. That
is, we would like to know the value of the probability:
δ(p; θ) = Pθ[Y ≤ cˆ(p|X)], (14)
where the capital level cˆ(p|X) is now viewed as a random variable. Essen-
tially (14) states the expected probability of solvency from the perspective
of a regulator, when the capital is set according to (13). Ideally it would
be δ(p; θ) = p, as it would mean that the adjustment to the capital setting
regime raised the probability of solvency to its required level. An example
where such consistency holds is given next.
Example 9. Let i.i.d. X1, . . . , Xn, Y follow F (x; θ) = 1 − e−xθ , x ≥ 0.
Standard arguments show that for prior pi(θ) = θ−ν , ν ≥ 0 and observed
sample X = x, the predictive distribution obtained is
fˆ(y|x) = (n+ ν − 1) (
∑
j xj)
n+ν−1
(y +
∑
j xj)
n+ν
⇒ Pˆ [Y > y|x] =
( ∑
j xj
y +
∑
j xj
)n+ν−1
,
which is a Pareto distribution; hence the allowance for parameter uncertainty
has turned the distribution used for capital assessment from a light- to a
heavy tailed one. Capital can then be set as:
cˆ(p|x) = Fˆ−1(p|x) =
∑
j
xj
[
(1− p)−1/(n+ν−1) − 1
]
.
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The expected frequency of insolvencies under this capital setting method is
given by
δ(p; θ) = Pθ [Y > cˆ(p|X)]
= Pθ

Y >∑
j
Xj
(
(1− p)−1/(n+ν−1) − 1
)
= Pθ
[ ∑
j Xj∑
j Xj + Y
< (1− p)1/(n+ν−1)
]
.
The quantity
∑
j Xj∑
j Xj+Y
follows a Beta(n, 1) distribution with cumulative dis-
tribution B(x;n, 1) = xn, x ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore
δ(p; θ) = (1− p)n/(n+ν−1) (15)
Note that if we let ν = 1, that is, if we use an uninformative prior of the
form pi(θ) = θ−1 appropriate for scale families [30], we get
δ(p; θ) = 1− p⇔ δ(p; θ) = p,
as required.
The example demonstrated the potential effectiveness of using a pre-
dictive distribution for capital setting, in satisfying the regulatory solvency
probability requirement. Such consistency between Bayesian and frequentist
methods [24],[22] is more generally true for the transformed (location-) scale
families discussed in this paper. In particular, as shown in Proposition 2 in
the Appendix, for such distributions, when the prior pi(µ, σ) = σ−1 is used,
it is always the case that δ(p; θ) = p. More broadly, for priors of the form
pi(µ, σ) = σ−ν , we find that the resulting solvency probability again does not
depend on the real parameters, so that the probability can be potentially
calculated by a regulator.
4 DATA POOLING
In Section 3 it was argued that the effect of parameter uncertainty on sol-
vency can be addressed by a stricter regulatory regime, adopting a higher
confidence level or more dispersed loss distribution. These are actions that
a regulator may take. Portfolio holders on the other hand can increase their
probability of solvency by addressing the key issue discussed in this paper:
lack of sufficient data.
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We assume that the losses from the portfolios of a number of different
companies, follow distributions with the same parameters, after appropriate
adjustments. (This simplifying assumption is of course quite strong. We
are not concerned here with credibility theory, the optimal combined use of
a company’s own and benchmark data for pricing purposes [27], which has
also been proposed in the context of operational risk capital setting [31]).
Then the portfolio holders may decide to pool their data in order that each
of them is able to estimate their required capital from a larger data set. As
a consequence the solvency probability of each should increase.
We note that the setting here is somewhat contrived, as it is required
that companies have independent risk exposures following similar probability
distributions, which are estimated using the same benchmark data set. This
is a situation not easily envisaged in insurance risk management. However in
operational risk management, pooling of loss data between different financial
institutions does occur [32], while it is not unreasonable to assume that
operational risk losses are independent across institutions.
A side-effect of pooling data is that, even if the losses from different port-
folios are independent, the portfolio (in)solvency events become dependent.
This is because the capital of each portfolio is calculated on the basis of the
same random sample. Hence there is a chance that the capital is collectively
over- or under-stated for all portfolios. One has to then examine the effect
of data sharing on systemic stability, for example via the joint probability
of insolvency. Such an examination is given below, for the simple example
of two portfolios with exponentially distributed losses. The process can be
carried out for losses in any (location-) scale family, as the joint insolvency
probability will again be independent of the true parameter θ.
Example 10. Consider the simple case where only two portfolios exist, and
all losses, within and across portfolios, are i.i.d. Hence we have
X1 = (X1,1, . . . , X1,n1), Y1
X2 = (X2,1, . . . , X2,n2), Y2
}
∼ F (·; θ),
where F is an exponential or Pareto distribution. Let X = (X1,X2) and
n = n1 + n2. First consider the case that data are not pooled. Then the
probability of insolvency for each portfolio is
Pθ[Yi > c(pi;Xi)] =
[
1 +
1
ni
log
1
1− pi
]−ni
, i = 1, 2
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and the joint probability of insolvency is given by:
Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X1), Y2 > c(p2;X2)] =
[
1 +
1
n1
log
1
1− p1
]−n1 [
1 +
1
n2
log
1
1− p2
]−n2
.
(16)
Let now the two portfolios merge their data sets. Then the probability of
insolvency for each portfolio is
Pθ[Yi > c(p;X)] =
[
1 +
1
n
log
1
1− pi
]−n
, i = 1, 2,
which is lower than Pθ[Yi > c(pi;Xi)], demonstrating the beneficial effect of
data sharing. Calculation yields the joint probability of insolvency as
Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X), Y2 > c(p2;X)] =
[
1 +
1
n
log
(
1
(1− p1)(1− p2)
)]−n
.
(17)
So which of the two situations (pooled or un-pooled data) produces a lower
joint probability of insolvency? Observe that
Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X), Y2 > c(p2;X)]
−1/n = 1 +
1
n
log
(
1
(1− p1)(1− p2)
)
=
1
n
[
n1
(
1 +
1
n1
log
1
1− p1
)
+ n2
(
1 +
1
n2
log
1
1− p2
)]
≥
[(
1 +
1
n1
log
1
1− p1
)n1 (
1 +
1
n2
log
1
1− p2
)n2]1/n
= Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X1), Y2 > c(p2;X2)]
−1/n,
(where the inequality follows from the fact that the arithmetic mean is greater
than the geometric one) implying
Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X), Y2 > c(p2;X)] ≤ Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X1), Y2 > c(p2;X2)]
Note that an equality is obtained only for n1 log(1 − p1) = n2 log(1 − p2);
in particular when p1 = p2 we have equality for n1 = n2. In this simple
example, pooling of data is beneficial at the individual portfolio, as well as
the systemic level.
For a numerical example we fix p1 = p2 = 0.995 and let n1 = 10, 20, 50.
In figure 3a) we plot against n2 the correlation of the indicator functions
of insolvency events {Y1 > c(p1;X)}, {Y2 > c(p2;X)}. This ‘insolvency
event correlation’ is similar to the default correlation encountered in credit
risk analysis [7]. It can be seen that the correlation is positive, indicating
the positive dependence that the pooling of data induces. The correlation
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Figure 3: The effect of pooling on joint insolvency, for exponential/Pareto
losses, n1 = 10, , 20, 50 and p1 = p2 = 0.995: a) insolvency event corre-
lation; b) ratio of the joint insolvency probabilities Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X), Y2 >
c(p2;X)]/Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X1), Y2 > c(p2;X2)].
is reduced when the number of available data n1, n2 increases. In figure
3b), the ratio of the joint insolvency probabilities Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X), Y2 >
c(p2;X)]/Pθ[Y1 > c(p1;X1), Y2 > c(p2;X2)] is plotted. It is seen that the
ratio is always < 1, such that data pooling, while introducing insolvency
correlation, does not increase systemic risk. The lowest values of the ratio
are obtained when n1 and n2 are very different. This implies that the greatest
benefit of pooling data is obtained when, of the two data-sets pooled, the one
is small and the other large.
5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In the article it is argued that a frequentist interpretation of parameter un-
certainty is appropriate for quantifying its effect on the solvency probability
of loss portfolios, when seen through the eyes of a regulator. It is shown that
for a rich class of loss distributions, solvency probabilities can be explicitly
calculated (even though the real parameters remain unknown) and depend
strongly on the size of the data set used for the estimation of risk capital. In
particular we show that for small datasets the true probability of insolvency
for a portfolio can be much higher than the notional one. When taking
the viewpoint of a financial firm, a Bayesian interpretation of uncertainty
is more appropriate. Hence we propose an improvement on current capital
setting regimes, based on percentiles of predictive distributions, and use a
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result from the theory of predictive inference [22] in order to reconcile the
two viewpoints.
We also argue that data sharing arrangements should be examined from
the point of view of systemic risk, due to the dependence of insolvency events
induced by portfolio holders using the same dataset.
The key results for our article are Propositions 1 and 2. These only hold
for loss distributions that can be transformed to (location-) scale ones. The
assumption is of course rather restrictive; it is however the price we have to
pay for deriving explicit formulas for small samples. More general results
could be derived by asymptotic arguments[21],[24] that we do not pursue
here; such an approach may be of interest, but the case of large samples is
possibly less relevant for the study of parameter uncertainty.
Throughout the article we have assumed that the data are independent of
each other and of future losses. This assumption is not necessarily realistic;
dependency of loss variables, in particular at the tails of distributions, is
a recurring theme in financial risk management [7]. Propositions 1 and 2
can easily be extended for data following an arbitrary joint distribution with
transformed (location-) scale marginals, as long as the dependence structure
is known. The case when the dependence structure itself is unknown and
must be estimated from the data is harder and is the subject of future work.
An issue that we have not addressed at all is model uncertainty, since we
assumed that the family of distributions that each random variable follows is
known. Insofar, our results for insolvency probability may form a best-case
scenario, as the inclusion of model uncertainty may paint an even bleaker
picture of financial firms’ solvency probabilities. Extension of our reasoning
to a framework addressing model uncertainty is possible. Bayesian reasoning
in the context of model unertainty is well-established [10],[12]. A frequentist
view of model uncertainty is also possible, if one formalises model selection
according to a prescribed criterion as a data-driven random process. Such
an analysis can form the basis of a future investigation.
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APPENDIX: FORMAL STATEMENTS AND PROOFS
For the statements of results and derivations in the appendix, all distribu-
tions considered are continuous, invertible and have a corresponding density.
All random variables are independent. Many of the results stated below are
rather simple and can be found in mathematical statistics textbooks; they
are restated here for reasons of clarity and completeneess.
A Increasing transformations
For a sample X = (X1, . . . , Xn), such that Xi ∼ Fi(·; θ), i = 1, . . . , n,
consider an estimator of the parameter θ, given by θˆ(X;F1, · · · , Fn). Given
functions hi : R→ R, i = 1, . . . , n, use the notation h◦X = (h1(X1), . . . , hn(Xn)).
Consider then a transformed sample X∗ = (X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
n) such that X
∗
i ∼
F ∗i (·; θ), i = 1, . . . , n, so that the estimator of θ from the transformed sam-
ple is θˆ(X∗;F ∗1 , · · · , F ∗n).
Consider now that a Bayesian approach. A prior pi(·) is defined over θ,
such that the posterior is given by pi(θ|X) ∝ pi(θ)∏n=1j fj(Xj ; θ). Assuming
that the same prior pi is used, denote by pi∗(θ|X∗) ∝ pi(θ)∏n=1j f∗j (X∗j ; θ)
the posterior of θ from the transformed sample.
Lemma 1. Consider X and X∗ as above with h1, . . . , hn be strictly increas-
ing functions. Then:
i) The maximum likelihood estimator θˆ is invariant to the transforma-
tions h1, . . . , hn, in the sense that
θˆ(X;F1, · · · , Fn) = θˆ(X∗;F ∗1 , · · · , F ∗n).
ii) The posterior of θ is invariant to h1, . . . , hn, in the sense that
pi(θ;X) = pi∗(θ;X∗).
Proof. Let vi(s) = hi(s). The likelihood of the transformed sample X is
n∏
j=1
f∗j (X
∗
j ; θ) =
n∏
j=1
v′(X∗j )fj(v(X
∗
j ); θ) =
n∏
j=1
v′(h(Xj))
n∏
j=1
fj(Xj ; θ),
Hence the likelihood of the transformed sample X∗ is the same as that of
the sample X, multiplied by a term that does not contain θ. From this both
i) and ii) immediately follow.
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Lemma 2. Let Xi ∼ Fi(·; θ), i = 1, . . . , n, Y ∼ F (·; θ) and transformed
variables X∗i = hi(Xi) ∼ F ∗i (·; θ), i = 1, . . . , n, Y ∗ = h(Y ) ∼ F ∗(·; θ) where
the functions h1, . . . , n, h are strictly increasing.
i) Let θˆ(X;F1, . . . , Fn) be the maximum likelihood estimator. Then
Pθ[Y ≤ F−1(p; θˆ(X;F1, . . . , Fn))] = Pθ[Y ∗ ≤ F ∗−1(p; θˆ(X∗;F ∗1 , . . . , F ∗n))]
ii) Denote the predictive distributions derived from the original and trans-
formed samples by Fˆ (y|X) = ∫ F (y; η)pi(η|X)dη,
Fˆ ∗(y|X∗) = ∫ F ∗(y; η)pi∗(η|X∗)dη respectively. Then
Pθ[Y ≤ Fˆ−1(p|X)] = Pθ[Y ∗ ≤ Fˆ ∗−1(p|X∗)].
Proof. Part i): By Lemma 1i) and the strict increasingness of h,
Pθ[Y
∗ ≤ F ∗−1(p; θˆ(X∗;F ∗1 , . . . , F ∗n))] = Pθ[h(Y ) ≤ h◦F−1(p; θˆ(X;F1, . . . , Fn))],
which yields the required result.
Part ii): From Lemma 1ii) it follows that Fˆ ∗(y|X∗) = Fˆ (h−1(y)|X) ⇒
Fˆ ∗−1(p|X∗) = h ◦ Fˆ−1(p|X). Therefore Pθ[Y ∗ ≤ Fˆ ∗−1(p|X∗)] = Pθ[h(Y ) ≤
h ◦ Fˆ−1(p|X)], which yields the required result.
B Transformed location-scale families
All definitions and results are given for 2-parameter location-scale families,
since results and proofs for location or scale families are very similar.
A set ALS of univariate probability distributions is called a location-
scale family if for every X1 ∼ F1 ∈ ALS , X2 ∼ F2 ∈ ALS we can write X2 d=
aX1+b for some a > 0, b ∈ R. We can choose an particular element F ∈ ALS
and call this the standard distribution of the family ALS . Let Z ∼ F . Then
for every X with a distribution in ALS , we can write X d= µ+σZ, σ > 0 and
use the notation X ∼ F (·;µ, σ), where F (x;µ;σ) = F (x−µσ ). It obviously
is Z ∼ F (·; 0, 1).
Let ALS be a location-scale family. A set AhLS of univariate probability
distributions is called a transformed location-scale family, if there is strictly
increasing function h such that for any X ∈ AhLS it is h−1(X) ∈ ALS . Then
we can write X ∼ F (·;µ, σ;h), where F (x;µ, σ;h) = F
(
h−1(x)−µ
σ
)
, with F
the standard distribution of ALS .
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Lemma 3. Consider Xi ∼ Fi (·;µ, σ) , i = i, . . . , n, belonging to location-
scale families. Then the maximum likelihood estimator θˆ(X;F1, . . . , Fn) =
(µˆ(X;F1, . . . , Fn), σˆ(X;F1, . . . , Fn)) is location-scale equivariant in the sense
that
θˆ(aX+ b;F1, . . . , Fn) = (aµˆ(X;F1, . . . , Fn) + b, aσˆ(X;F1, . . . , Fn)),
for all a > 0, b ∈ R.
Proof. Let θˆ = (µˆ, σˆ) maximise the likelihood
n∏
j=1
fj(Xj ;µ, σ) =
n∏
j=1
1
σ
fj
(
Xj − µ
σ
)
,
where fi(·) is the standardised density ofXi. For a > 0 consider transformed
sample X∗i = aXi + b, i = 1, . . . , n. Its likelihood is:
n∏
j=1
fj(X
∗
j ;µ, σ) =
n∏
j=1
1
σ
fj
(
aXj + b− µ
σ
)
= a−n
n∏
j=1
1
σ/a
fj
(
Xj − (µ− b)/a
σ/a
)
So if θˆ∗ = (µˆ∗, σˆ∗) maximises the likelihood of the transformed sample,
it follows that (µˆ∗ − b)/a = µˆ, σˆ∗/a = σˆ from which the required result
follows.
Consequently, the maximum likelihood estimator (µˆ, σˆ) has joint distri-
bution G(·, ·;µ, θ) and (assuming it is well defined) density g(·, ·;µ, θ), that
can be written as
G(m, s;µ, σ) = G
(
m− µ
σ
,
s
σ
)
, g(m, s;µ, σ) =
1
σ2
g
(
m− µ
σ
,
s
σ
)
,
(18)
where G(m, s) ≡ G(m, s; 0, 1) and g(m, s) = ∂2∂m∂sG(m, s) do not depend on
µ, σ.
Lemma 4. Consider Xi ∼ Fi (·;µ, σ) , i = i, . . . , n, belonging to location-
scale families. Then, assuming a prior of the form pi(µ, σ) = σ−ν , ν ≥ 0,
the posterior density is location-scale equivariant in the sense that
pi(µ, σ|aX+ b) = 1
a2
pi
(
µ− b
a
,
σ
a
|X
)
for all a > 0, b ∈ R.
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Proof. Let X∗i = aXi + b, i = 1, . . . , n, and denote by pi
∗(m, s;X∗) the
posterior density of the parameters under transformed sample, so that:
pi∗(m, s|X∗) = I(X∗)−1s−ν
n∏
j=1
fj(X
∗
j ;m, s),
where I(X∗) is the normalising constant. It is:
s−ν
n∏
j=1
fj(X
∗
j ;m, s) = s
−ν
n∏
j=1
1
s
fj
(
aXj + b−m
s
)
= a−n−ν
(s
a
)−ν n∏
j=1
1
s/a
fj
(
Xj ;
m− b
a
,
s
a
)
On the other hand:
I(X∗) =
∫
m∈R
∫
s∈R++
s−νa−n
n∏
j=1
1
s/a
fj
(
Xj ;
m− b
a
,
s
a
)
dsdm
Making the substitutions ζ = m−ba , η =
s
a , we get
I(X∗) =
∫
ζ∈R
∫
η∈R++
η−νa−n−ν
n∏
j=1
1
η
fj (Xj ; ζ, η) a
2dηdζ = a2−ν−nI(X),
from which the result follows.
C Main results
Proposition 1. Consider Xi ∼ Fi (·;µ, σ;hi) , i = i, . . . , n, Y ∼ F (·;µ, σ;h),
belonging to transformed location-scale families. Let (µˆ(X), σˆ(X)) be the
maximum likelihood estimator. Then the probability γ(p;µ, σ) = Pµ,σ[Y ≤
F−1(p; µˆ, σˆ;h)] is given by
γ(p;µ, σ) =
∫
ζ∈R
∫
η∈R++
F
(
ζ + ηF−1(p)
)
g (ζ, η) dηdζ, (19)
where F is the distribution of h
−1(Y )−µ
σ , and g(·, ·) is a bivariate density
function as in eq. (18). Therefore γ(p;µ, σ) does not depend on the param-
eters (µ, σ).
Proof. We prove the result only for the case of location-scale families. The
extension to transformed location scale families is achieved by Lemma 2i).
Applying Lemma 3, we have
γ(p;µ, σ) = Eµ,σPµ,σ[Y ≤ F−1(p; µˆ, σˆ;h)|(µˆ, σˆ)]
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=∫
m∈R
∫
s∈R++
F
(
F−1(p;m, s);µ, σ
)
g(m, s;µ, σ)dsdm
=
∫
m∈R
∫
s∈R++
F
(
m− µ
σ
+
s
σ
F−1(p)
)
1
σ2
g
(
m− µ
σ
,
s
σ
)
dsdm
Carrying out the change of variables m−µσ = ζ,
s
σ = η yields the stated
result.
Proposition 2. Consider Xi ∼ Fi (·;µ, σ;hi) , i = i, . . . , n, Y ∼ F (·;µ, σ;h),
belonging to transformed location-scale families. Let Fˆ (y;h|X) be the pre-
dictive distribution of Y given the data X, obtained using prior pi(µ, σ) =
σ−ν , ν ≥ 0. Then the probability δ(p;µ, σ) = Pµ,σ[Y ≤ Fˆ−1(p;h|X)] is
given by
δ(p;µ, σ) = Eµ,σ
[
F
(
Fˆ−1(p;h|Z)
)]
, (20)
where F is the distribution of h
−1(Y )−µ
σ and Zi =
h−1i (Xi)−µ
σ , i = 1, . . . , n,
so that δ(p;µ, σ) does not depend on the parameters (µ, σ). In particular,
for ν = 1 it is:
δ(p;µ, σ) = p. (21)
Proof. We prove the result only for the case of location-scale families. The
extension to transformed location scale families is achieved by Lemma 2ii).
Let X∗i = aXi + b, a > 0, i = 1, . . . , n. By Lemma 4 we have
Fˆ (y|X∗) =
∫
m∈R
∫
s∈R++
F (y;m, s)pi(m, s|X∗)dsdm
=
∫
m∈R
∫
s∈R++
F
(
y −m
s
)
1
a2
pi
(
m− b
a
,
s
a
|X
)
dsdm
Making the substitutions ζ = m−ba , η =
s
a it follows that
Fˆ (y|X∗) = Fˆ
(
y − b
a
|X
)
⇒ Fˆ−1(p|X∗) = aFˆ−1 (p|X) + b
Thus Fˆ−1(p|X) = σFˆ−1 (p|Z) + µ, where Zi = Xi−µσ , i = 1, . . . , n. Conse-
quently
δ(p;µ, σ) = Eµ,σ
[
F
(
Fˆ−1(p|X);µ, σ
)]
,
from which equation 20 directly follows. Equation 21 is obtained as a
direct application of Proposition 1 and Example 1 in [22]. A necessary
condition of the Proposition is the ‘invariance of the predictive region,’
which in our notation means the requirement that Y ≤ Fˆ−1(p|X) ⇔ aY +
b ≤ Fˆ−1(p|aX + b), a > 0. This follows directly from the statement
Fˆ−1(p|aX+ b) = aFˆ−1 (p|X) + b which has been shown earlier in the proof.
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